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I. INTRODUCTION

On September 28, 1997, a resident at the Comanche Trail
Nursing Center physically attacked his eighty-one-year-old roommate,
Tranquilino Mendoza. 1 As a result of the attack, Mr. Mendoza suffered
1.

Casas v. Paradez, No. 04-06-00417-CV, 2007 WL 2479602, at *3 (Tex. App. Sept. 5,

2007), opinion withdrawn and superseded on rehearingby Casas v. Paradez, 267 S.W.3d 170, 177
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a concussion and brain damage. 2 His daughter claimed that her father
was never the same after the attack and filed a lawsuit against the
long-term care facility alleging negligence. 3 In 2006, a jury awarded
4
Mr. Mendoza $160 million.
Similarly, on April 26, 2003, a resident of the Heritage House
Nursing and Rehabilitation Center allegedly attacked Carolyn Mason,
another resident at the same facility. 5 Mrs. Mason suffered a broken
hip. 6 Like Mr. Mendoza, she filed a lawsuit against the long-term care
facility alleging negligence. 7 But instead of proceeding toward trial,
Heritage House produced Mrs. Mason's seven-page admission
agreement and moved
to compel
arbitration.8 Apparently
unbeknownst to Mrs. Mason, pages five and six of the admission
contract required that "any legal dispute which might arise shall be
resolved exclusively by binding arbitration."9 Four years after the
attack, the Mississippi Court of Appeals upheld the arbitration clause,
thereby preventing Mrs. Mason from taking her case to trial. 10
As a result, Mrs. Mason will argue her case in front of an
arbitration panel rather than a judge and jury. If Mrs. Mason
experienced abuse or neglect at Heritage House, a jury never will hear
about it-she waived that right, which otherwise is guaranteed by the
Constitution. 1 Additionally, the public never will learn the outcome of

(Tex. App. 2008). Upon entering judgment, however, the trial court applied a statutory damages
cap reducing the award considerably. Id. at 178.
2.
Id. at 177.
3.
Id.
4.
Id. at 178. The trial court reduced the judgment pursuant to statutory damage caps, but
Mr. Mendoza's estate was nevertheless awarded over $10 million. Natalie White, Top 10 Jury
Verdicts of 2006, LAW. WKLY., http://www.lawyersusaonline.com/2topten2OO6.cfm (last visited
Nov. 2, 2007). The $160 million jury award was the second largest verdict in the United States in
2006. Id.
5.
Cmty. Care Ctr. of Vicksburg v. Mason, 966 So. 2d 220, 223-24 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
6.
Id. at 224.
7.
Id.
8.
Id. at 223, 226-27.
9.
Id. at 223 (internal quotation marks omitted).
10. Id. at 231.
11. See Jean R. Sternlight, In Defense of Mandatory Binding Arbitration (If Imposed on the
Company), 8 NEV. L.J. 82, 95 (2007) (discussing the fact that the Seventh Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution guarantees disputants the right to a jury trial in certain situations). Interestingly,
the California Supreme Court has responded to this issue by holding that a pre-dispute
contractual waiver to a jury trial is not enforceable in a civil action in California. Avoiding a jury
trial, however, is still possible through an arbitration agreement with legally enforceable
provisions. See, e.g., Grafton v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 490, 492 (Cal. 2005) (distinguishing
pre-dispute contractual waivers of a jury trial and arbitration agreements).
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her case12 because arbitration is generally confidential.13 Perhaps of
greatest importance, Mrs. Mason lost her most valuable tools for
negotiating a settlement. Because Heritage House has no reason to
fear the unknown factors that play into a jury verdict, any settlement
likely will be limited to compensatory damages. 14 Further, damages
often are capped contractually in arbitration agreements, and if they
are not capped, they are generally very low for the elderly and
disabled long-term care population. 15 Finally, there is at least the
suspicion that industry-wide arbitration tends to favor the repeat
players-here the nursing homes-because arbitrators want future
16
case referrals.
The plight of Mrs. Mason is not uncommon. Mandatory predispute arbitration agreements are the emerging standard in longterm care ("LTC") admission contracts all around the country. The
agreements are "mandatory" because arbitration is the only form of
dispute resolution available to an aggrieved LTC resident when a
claim arises. This form of arbitration agreement is "pre-dispute"
because the resident/signer agrees to arbitrate any disputes that may
arise between the parties in the future, rather than take those
disputes to court. Pre-dispute arbitration agreements differ from postdispute agreements, in which parties agree to arbitrate a specific

12. See John R. Gillespie, Jr. & Andrew Ulloa, Gillespie & Ulloa, The Nuts and Bolts of
Nursing Home Arbitration Agreements, 10 Nursing Home Litig. Rep. (West) 2 (Sept. 14, 2007)
(noting that confidentiality, at least for the LTC industry, is "[o]ne of the well-known advantages
of arbitration").
13. GEORGE W. KUNEY, THE ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT DRAFTING WITH QUESTIONS AND
CLAUSES FOR CONSIDERATION 121 (2d ed. 2006). Arbitration is often appealing to long-term care
facilities for this exact reason. In fact, arbitration gained momentum in the early 1980s because
it was "considered to be beneficial, featuring more privacy, less cost, and more speed than
traditional litigation, and eliminating the wildcard decision-maker that is a civil jury." Id.

14. See id.:
[T]he mere elimination of the jury is often enough to allow for early settlement of a
dispute. Without a jury, the parties are faced with the cold, hard facts of their cases
and the legal arguments involved, and have less incentive to roll the dice with a lay
jury that may be swayed by theatrics, passion, rhetoric, and prejudice.

15.

See, e.g., Suzanne Gallagher, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Nursing Home

Admission Agreements: The Rights of Elders, 3 NAT'L AcAD. ELDER L. ATT'Ys J. 187, 198 (2007)
(noting that arbitration agreements that cap damages are often upheld despite public policy
arguments to the contrary).

16. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WiS. L. REV. 33, 60-62 (noting
that "independent arbitration companies have an economic interest in being looked on kindly by
large institutional corporate defendants who can bring repeat business"); see also Gillespie &
Ulloa, supra note 12, at 2 (noting that courts in Florida are beginning to be "wary of agreements
that appear to create a 'stacked deck' by designating a specific arbitrator or a very limited pool of
potential arbitrators").
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dispute after it has arisen. 17 This Note refers to mandatory predispute
arbitration
agreements
as
"mandatory
arbitration
agreements."
As mandatory arbitration agreements are discovered by
consumers and claims arise,' 8 questions surrounding the legality and
propriety of these agreements emerge. Critics of mandatory
arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts urge that these
provisions are intrinsically unfair. 19 Arbitration provisions in nursing
home contracts generally deny the elderly and disabled the right to
raise any and all claims in court. 20 Exacerbating this problem is the
fact that admission to a nursing home is usually a remarkably
stressful event for residents and their families. 2' Critics worry that
families admitting a loved one to a nursing home are not capable of
making rational and informed legal decisions. 22 For example, a typical
family may not appreciate the importance of a binding arbitration
agreement in an admissions packet that also includes a plethora of
technical documents, including Medicare information, patient rights,
23
advance directives, and resident conduct policies.
Also problematic is the fact that families often must take the
first and only bed that becomes available in an LTC facility. 24 Waiting
periods of up to one year for an available bed are common, and
because "residents can no longer manage the simple activities of daily

17. Hereinafter, this Note will refer to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements as
"mandatory arbitration agreements."
18. In the long-term care context, the arbitration agreement is usually discovered by the
elderly, disabled, or their next of kin after a problem has arisen.
19. See, e.g., Rebecca Porter, Nursing Home Death Shows Need to Ban Mandatory
Arbitration, TRIAL, Sept. 2008, at 52, 52-53 (describing how one family's experience with
mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration led them to support the Fairness in Nursing Home
Arbitration Act of 2008 (S. 2838), which would "ensure that arbitration is voluntary by
prohibiting the enforcement of mandatory, predispute arbitration clauses").
20. Ann E. Krasuski, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Do Not Belong in
Nursing Home Contracts with Residents, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 263, 292 (2004).
Arbitration agreements generally preclude all claims arising out of the relationship of the
parties, whether sounding in contract, tort, or another theory, like antitrust.
21. See, e.g., William J. McAuley & Shirley S. Travis, Factors Influencing Level of Stress
During the Nursing Home Decision Process, 6 J. CLINIcAL GEROPSYCHOL. 269, 269 (2000) ("The
decisions and actions leading to nursing home admissions are among the most difficult and least
rewarding that caregivers of impaired older people must make. The process of
institutionalization is often associated with feelings of separation, abandonment, pain, sorrow,
blame, difficulty, guilt, stress, and loss of control," (citations omitted)).
22. See id. at 276 (suggesting that more time should be given "to complete the complex and
arduous process of nursing home decision-making").
23. Krasuski, supra note 20, at 264.
24. Charles A. Lattanzi, Nursing Home Contracts: Is It Time for Bad Faith to Come out of
Retirement?, 6 J.L. & HEALTH 61, 68-69 (1991).
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life, and usually have no one willing to care for them, they literally
have no other option." 25 Thus, it is possible that some families become
so desperate to obtain an available bed that they are simply at the
26
mercy of the LTC facility and its mandatory arbitration agreement.
In the most extreme situation, failing to notice a mandatory
arbitration agreement or giving in to the need for an available bed (at
27
any cost) is the difference between Mr. Mendoza and Mrs. Mason.
Proponents of mandatory arbitration agreements in LTC
contracts, on the other hand, urge that arbitration agreements are
necessary to ensure the survival of the industry. 28 Facing the prospect
of caring for the seventy-seven million aging Baby Boomers, some
industry insiders fear the financial demise of the LTC industry if
runaway jury verdicts persist. 29 The LTC industry has found itself in a
vicious cycle as it struggles to strike a balance between quality and
cost. 30 Cost-saving measures lead to insufficient staffing, which often
leads to abuse and neglect. 31 This abuse and neglect may result in
large jury verdicts, which strain resources and further perpetuate the
cycle. 32 Recently hit with off-the-chart jury awards for negligence,
abuse, and neglect, the industry has experienced severe financial
25. Id.; see also Patricia Nemore, Representing the Elderly Client, Nursing Home Issues, 149
PRAC. L. INST. 59, 102 (1988):
The facts that nursing home contracts are printed on the facility's own form, that the
language is all boiler plate except for the resident's name and the rate (for private
pay), that the contract is offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with no bargaining for
any of the terms, that in many places bed shortages leave the applicant or family no
choice but to agree to the terms, and that the transaction itself is inherently stressful
to the applicant and family all strongly support a finding by a court that the waiver is
invalid.
26. See supranotes 24-25 and accompanying text.
27. Cf. Cmty. Care Ctr. of Vicksburg v. Mason, 966 So. 2d 220, 223-24 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)
(upholding a pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clause); Casas v. Paradez, 267 S.W.3d 170, 177
(Tex. App. 2008) (discussing jury award of $160 million).
28. See Liza Berger, Playing It Safe, McKNIGHT'S LONG-TERM CARE NEWS, May 2007, at 40,
41 (discussing arbitration as an alternative to "lawsuits that can end up in the hands of a jury,
which can result in a runaway verdict").
29. See Stephen A. Moses, Aging America's Achilles' Heel: Medicaid Long-Term Care, 549
POLY ANALYSIS 1, 1 (2005), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa549.pdf ("Medicaid is the

principal payor for long-term care (LTC), especially nursing home care. LTC is an 800-pound
gorilla of social problems that lurks just around the bend. If we wait to deal with Medicaid and
LTC until after we handle Social Security and Medicare, it will be too late.").
30. See, e.g., Paradez, 267 S.W.3d at 176 (discussing nursing home's marketing plan to
increase revenue that included recruiting new patients even though the director repeatedly
complained of "insufficient and inadequately trained staff').
31. Jennifer L. Troyer & Herbert G. Thompson, Jr., The Impact of Litigation on Nursing
Home Quality, 29 J. HEALTH POL. PoLY & L. 11, 12 (2004) (articulating the argument that
'litigation against nursing homes causes more resources to be dedicated to legal expenses...
and fewer resources to be allocated to patient care').
32. Id.
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losses. 33 These losses, combined with a perception of dwindling
Medicare funding and a growing population, place "greater financial
strains on nursing homes" and make it harder to improve quality
standards. 34 Proponents urge that imposing mandatory arbitration
agreements on residents and families is a simple, low-cost method of
reducing the risk of multi-million dollar punitive damage awards,
reducing liability insurance premiums, and increasing public
confidence in the LTC industry.3 5 Proponents also argue that forcing
these high-dollar cases into arbitration is the Band-Aid the LTC
industry needs to ensure its economic survival.
Arbitration agreements are becoming the status quo in LTC
contracts. The arbitration agreement itself generally spells out the
exact terms of the arbitration process. 36 Distinctive features of
arbitration include the facts that arbitrators often do not consider
themselves bound by precedent, discovery is limited in scope,
arbitration is generally confidential, and arbitration is almost always
binding and not reviewable.3 7 It is, however, difficult to generalize
about the arbitral experience because the procedure varies greatly
8
from contract to contract. 3
This Note urges the reexamination of the use of mandatory
arbitration agreements in LTC contracts and offers a new approach.
Part II of this Note begins by examining and outlining the history of
arbitration in America and its eventual rise in popularity. It also

33. See, e.g., Scott Baranick, Law Firm's Success Against Nursing Homes Has a Price, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), July 24, 2004, at 1D, available at http://www.sptimes.
com/2004/07/24/Business/Law firm_s_successag.shtml (discussing jury awards against nursing
homes); cf. Milo Geyelin, Older Victims Winning Bigger in Damage Suits, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4,
1995, at B1 (discussing the increasing jury awards for elderly plaintiffs in other contexts).
34. See Joseph E. Casson & Julia McMillen, ProtectingNursing Home Companies: Limiting
Liability Through Corporate Restructuring, 36 J. HEALTH L. 577, 580 (2003) (explaining that
nursing homes are currently facing two substantial risks: (1) "exposure to exclusion from the
Medicare and Medicaid programs," and (2) "exposure to financial liability," including exposure
generated through potential negligence actions); Robert A. Hawks, Note, GrandparentMolesting:
Sexual Abuse of Elderly Nursing Home Residents and Its Prevention, 8 MARQ. ELDER'S ADVISOR
159, 186 (2006) (arguing that because jury awards "place greater financial strain on nursing
homes," which worsens "staffing conditions," the solution "must be found outside civil litigation");
see also Moses, supra note 29, at I (noting that, in 2005, Medicare had $60 trillion in "unaccounted for obligations").
35. Krasuski, supranote 20, at 266-67.
36.

See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 22-23 (2d ed.

2007) (describing arbitration agreements).
37.

LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 507, 613 (3d ed. 2005)

(noting that "manifest disregard of law" is considered the "seminal nonstatutory ground for
vacatur of commercial arbitration awards").
38. See id. at 513 ("As with most all of the dimensions of commercial arbitration, it is
difficult to generalize as to the extent and nature of pre-hearing discovery.").
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discusses the use of mandatory arbitration agreements in the modern
era-including their use in the LTC context.
Part III examines the most common defenses advanced by
plaintiffs attempting to defeat a motion to compel arbitration. This
Part explores the role of the Federal Arbitration Act 39 and the most
common defenses plaintiffs offer to defeat arbitration agreements,
including unconscionability and non-signatory arguments. This Part
ultimately concludes that current approaches used to combat motions
to compel arbitration are ill-suited to, and often fail in, the LTC
context.
Part IV briefly explores the current political climate
surrounding the use of these agreements. This Part advocates for a
new approach: employing a totality of the circumstances approach to
ensure that the consent to arbitrate is truly informed. Borrowing from
the Circle of Assent doctrine, a totality of the circumstances test seeks
to determine whether the parties actually bargained for and agreed
upon the individual terms of the contract and provides relief when a
"one-sided" arbitration clause "cannot reasonably be characterized as
unconscionable," but something about the agreement rings unjust. 40
The totality of the circumstances approach focuses on the following
factors: the readability, length, and headings in the agreement; the
substantive fairness of the agreement; the sophistication of the
consumer; the conditions surrounding consent; and the predictability
of the arbitration provision and its terms. This approach would permit
the LTC industry to continue using arbitration agreements but would
ensure that residents read and understand the terms and
consequences of the agreements. Essentially, this approach attempts
to ensure that consent is truly informed and that the parties are truly
agreeing to the arbitration provision and its terms.

II. THE RISE OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has taken a bipolar
approach to arbitration. Traditionally, "judicial jealousies" of the
arbitral forum led the Court to reject any arbitration agreement that
would "oust" it of jurisdiction. 41 The modern Court, however, largely

39. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006).
40. Robert M. Lloyd, The "Circleof Assent" Doctrine: An Important Innovation in Contract
Law, 7 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 237, 238 (2006).
41. Amy J. Schmitz, Refreshing ContractualAnalysis of ADR Agreements by CuringBipolar
Avoidance of Modern Common Law, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (2004).
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supports arbitration, even where it is mandatory. 42 As a result,
mandatory arbitration provisions currently are present in many
43
consumer contracts, including LTC admission agreements.
A. The Scope: Framingthe Issue of MandatoryArbitration
Mandatory arbitration agreements have become the status quo
in corporate America. The U.S. Supreme Court consistently has
expressed support for consumer arbitration. 44 Congress also has
backed the use of mandatory arbitration agreements. 45 Throughout
the 1990s, corporate giants, including McDonald's, eBay, Gateway,
and General Mills, began mandating consumer arbitration by
including arbitration agreements in packaging and contest
instructions. 46 The new millennium saw an even greater expansion of
47
consumer arbitration with its migration into the field of health care.
Defining the full reach of mandatory arbitration agreements in
the LTC industry is a frustrating and difficult task. A close
examination of current case law exposes a messy state of affairs, as
some courts are upholding mandatory consumer arbitration
agreements while others are striking them down. 48 Courts striking
down these agreements are doing so on a variety of theories, including
49
on Commerce Clause, unconscionability, and non-signatory grounds.
Likewise, a review of current legislative proposals highlights a great
fragmentation of views within this debate. 50 Over the past decade,
42. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995) (reversing the
Alabama Supreme Court and holding that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") preempted
Alabama's anti-arbitration statute).
43. See Krasuski, supra note 20, at 271, 273 (noting that arbitration agreements are
"pervasive in consumer contracts" and discussing their role in nursing home admissions).
44. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)
(remarking that a suspicion of arbitration is "out of step with our current strong endorsement of
the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes"); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974) (enforcing arbitration clause in agreement between parties
conducting an international commercial transaction, in accord with FAA).
45. Jean R. Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration,in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT 127, 129 (Edward Brunet et al. eds., 2006).
46. Id. at 129.
47. Id. at 127, 129.
48. See discussion infra Part III (summarizing the unpredictable judicial responses to
motions to compel arbitration in the LTC context).
49. See id. (examining the common lines of defenses used by plaintiffs to defeat a motion to
compel arbitration).
50. For a discussion of various viewpoints on pre-dispute mandatory binding arbitration,
see generally Mandatory Binding Arbitration Agreements: Are They Fair for Consumers?,
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. §§ 5-105 (2007); see also Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. §§
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however, it has become clear that the use of these agreements in the
LTC context is widespread. 51 Exactly how many LTC facilities employ
these agreements is unknown, but it is estimated that "most of the
nation's largest nursing home chains ... include arbitration
52
agreements in their admissions packets."
LTC facilities or their legal representatives generally write
their own arbitration agreements. At a minimum, most arbitration
agreements waive the right to a jury trial.53 A typical arbitration
agreement used by nursing homes reads:
Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, any action, dispute, claim or controversy of any
kind (e.g., whether in contract or in tort, statutory or common law, legal or equitable, or
otherwise) now existing or hereafter arising between the parties in any way arising out
of, pertaining to or in connection with the provision of health care services, any
agreement between the parties, the provision of any other goods or services by the
Health Care Center or other transactions, contracts or agreements of any kind
whatsoever, any past, present or future incidents, omissions, acts, errors, practices, or
occurrence causing injury to either party whereby the other party or its agents,
employees or representatives may be liable, in whole or in part, or any other aspect of
the past, present or future relationships between the parties shall be resolved by
binding arbitration administered by the National Health Lawyers Association (the
'NHLA').
THE UNDERSIGNED ACKNOWLEDGE THAT EACH OF THEM HAS READ
AND UNDERSTOOD THIS CONTRACT, AND THAT EACH OF THEM
54
VOLUNTARILY CONSENTS TO ALL OF ITS TERMS.

Some nursing homes use even shorter arbitration agreements similar
to the following:
BY AGREEING TO ARBITRATION OF ALL DISPUTES,
BOTH PARTIES ARE WAIVING A JURY TRIAL FOR ALL
CONTRACT,
TORT,
STATUTORY,
AND
OTHER

CLAIMS.55

The agreements vary widely in length and in content, and the terms of
the arbitration process generally are set out contractually. 56 However,
1-5 (2007); Recent Proposed Legislation: Arbitration FairnessAct of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong.
(2007), 121 HARv. L. REV. 2262, 2264-68 (2008) (discussing the proposed bill).
51. A now outdated 1997 study concluded that "contrary to popular belief.., arbitration
agreements are not used widely in the [healthcare] setting." Elizabeth Rolph, Erik Moller & John
E. Rolph, ArbitrationAgreements in Health Care: Myths and Reality, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
153, 153 (1997). A decade later, however, it is now clear that the use of these agreements in the
LTC context is pervasive. Krasuski, supra note 20, at 268.
52. Krasuski, supra note 20, at 268.
53. See, e.g., Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So. 2d 661, 663-64 (Ala. 2004)
(per curiam) (agreement compelling arbitration); Owens v. Nat'l Health Corp., 263 S.W.3d 876,
880-81 (Tenn. 2007) (same).
54. Briarcliff,894 So. 2d at 663-64.
55. Owens, 263 S.W.3d at 880-81.
56. See RISKIN ET AL., supra note 37, at 507 ("Private arbitration is based on contract and
the parties may shape the contours of their arbitration agreement to meet their needs.").
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these agreements are fairly representative of what is being used in the
standard LTC admission contract.
While arbitration mirrors traditional litigation in some
respects, there is generally great divergence between arbitration and
litigation in terms of the scope of discovery, 57 the applicable rules of
evidence, and the reviewability of the arbitrator's final decision. 58 For
example, an arbitration agreement can limit the number of witnesses,
experts, interrogatories, and length of time allotted for any given
arbitration hearing. 59 Moreover, arbitration hearings typically are
confidential, and the arbitrator may or may not issue a written
"reasoned decision" with the award of damages. 60 The arbitrator's
decision is almost always binding on the parties and cannot be
appealed in court absent abuse of discretion. 61 Additionally,
compensatory and punitive damages often are capped by the
62
arbitration agreement, making meaningful recovery difficult.
B. The FederalArbitrationAct
In the era before the consumer arbitration agreement became
the status quo, American jurisprudence exhibited an enduring
prejudice against arbitration. 63 Traditional "judicial jealousies" of the
arbitral forum led to the rejection of agreements that would "oust the
courts of jurisdiction. '64 As early as the 1920s, however, the threat of
arbitration began to yield to the philosophy that a "strong public
policy favoring arbitration over litigation" could produce a "speedy and
relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution" that had the

57. See Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration: An Assessment and
Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 343, 370-71 (1995) (discussing the role and
nature of discovery in the arbitration process).
58. See RISKIN ET AL., supra note 37, at 507 (discussing finality of the arbitrator's decision);
Hayford & Peeples, supra note 57, at 370-71 (discussing the role and nature of discovery and the
rules of evidence in the arbitration process).
59. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 3010 Before the H. Subcomm. on
Commercial and Administrative Law, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter ArbitrationFairnessAct of
2007: Hearing] (statement of Kenneth L. Connor, Attorney at Law) [hereinafter Statement of
Kenneth L. Connor], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/1025071.pdf.
60. See RISKIN ET AL., supra note 37, at 511 (noting that the inclusion of a "reasoned
decision" may depend on the type of case at issue in the arbitration).
61. Krasuski, supra note 20, at 265.
62. Some arbitration agreements purport to eliminate punitive damages altogether.
63. See Maureen A. Weston, Preserving the Federal ArbitrationAct by Reining in Judicial
Expansion and Mandatory Use, 8 NEV. L.J. 385, 385 (2007) ("The purpose of the [FAA] was to
reverse judicial hostility towards arbitration and to ensure the judicial enforcement of parties'
agreements to arbitrate.").
64. Schmitz, supranote 41, at 26-27.
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potential of easing chronic court congestion. 65 Policy arguments in
favor of arbitration gained momentum as the United States became an
increasingly industrialized nation of interstate commerce and
merchants began to interact at great distances and with more
frequency. 66 Responding to the need for an alternative dispute
resolution forum, Congress enacted the Uniform Arbitration Act, later
renamed the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). 67 The core provision of
the FAA, § 2 states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such
a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 68

In subsequent years, the Supreme Court interpreted the FAA as
giving courts broad preemptive power over state laws disfavoring
arbitration. 69 The Court held that "[i]n enacting § 2 [of the FAA],
Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew
the States' power to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
70
claims that contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration."
Essentially, if interstate commerce is present, federal law trumps
state law, and the FAA rules. 7 1

65. Gross v. Recabaren, 206 Cal. App. 3d 771, 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). Arbitration in the
United States became increasingly popular as the English began to enforce pre-dispute
arbitration agreements. Yielding to international commercial pressures, the New York Chamber
of Commerce sought to repeal the Rule of Revocability in the United States. Theodore Eisenberg
& Geoffrey Miller, The Market for Contracts 22-25 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-45, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=938557.
66. See Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Castle, The Revocability of Contract Provisions
ControllingResolution of Future Disputes Between the Parties, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207,
215 (2004) ("The movement's oft-stated purpose was to 'make the benefits of arbitration
generally available to the business world,' and it was driven primarily by those engaged in
interstate trade." (quoting Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 407
(2d Cir. 1959))).
67. See id. at 216 (describing the modernization of the Uniform Arbitration Act).
68. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
69. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) (holding that under the Supremacy
Clause, the FAA pre-empted California state law); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-12
(1984) (holding that if a state law directly conflicts with the FAA, it violates the Supremacy
Clause); RISKIN ET AL., supra note 37, at 516 ("[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has given the FAA
broad preemptive effect over related state arbitration law.").
70. Perry, 482 U.S. at 489.
71. This general rule is not true, however, for insurance contracts. The McCarran-Ferguson
Act can reverse-preempt the FAA's state law anti-arbitration provision. Elizabeth K. Stanley,
Parties'Defenses to Binding ArbitrationAgreements in the Health Care Field and the Operation
of the McCarran-FergusonAct, 38 ST. MARY'S L.J. 591, 596-97 (2007).
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The roots of mandatory arbitration can be traced back to the
security exchanges and brokerage industry in the late nineteenth
century. 72 After the New York Stock Exchange required its investors
to arbitrate disputes, other brokerages and exchanges quickly followed
suit.73 These agreements were widely enforced, even before the
passage of the FAA in 1925. In 1953, however, the Supreme Court
executed an about-face, interpreting the Securities Act of 1933 (the
"Securities Act") to prohibit this use of arbitration.7 4 In Wilko v. Swan,
an investor sued his brokerage house under § 12(2) of the Securities
Act, claiming misrepresentation. 75 The defendants moved to compel
arbitration "in accordance with the terms" of the margin agreements
between the investor and the brokerage house. 76 In a 7-2 vote, the
Court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement, holding that the
Securities Act "was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under
which buyers labor." 77 In this instance, the Court found that the
sellers had far more information available to them than the buyers
and that it was therefore "inappropriate to find that the customer had
knowingly selected arbitration."7 8 Wilko had a powerful effect over the
next three decades, as businesses grew increasingly hesitant to impose
mandatory arbitration on consumers. In yet another jurisprudential
shift, this timidity toward mandatory arbitration quickly gave way to
a welcoming embrace after the Supreme Court reversed course again.
In 1989, the Supreme Court overruled Wilko and held that
mandatory agreements to arbitrate would be enforceable. 79 The Court
held in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express that Wilko
was "incorrectly decided" and was "inconsistent with the prevailing
uniform construction of other federal statutes governing arbitration
agreements in the setting of business transactions," which favors
arbitration.8 0 Corporate America welcomed this change and almost
immediately began imposing mandatory arbitration on consumers.

72. Sternlight, supra note 45, at 128.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 428-29 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480-82 (1989).
76. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 429.
77. Sternlight, supra note 45, at 128-29 (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435).
78. Id. at 129.
79. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 480-82.
80. Id. at 484.
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C. The Modern Era and the Long-Term Care Industry
Rodriguez led to a new era of consumer arbitration that
subsequently has been expanded to include LTC facilities. Arbitration
now touches the lives of both sophisticated investors and
unsophisticated consumers, including the elderly and disabled. One
study found that over thirty-five percent of all healthcare contracts
entered into by the "average Joe" include arbitration agreements.8 1
While the Supreme Court currently favors arbitration, the Court has
yet to rule explicitly on whether mandatory arbitration agreements in
the LTC context are unique or whether they must be enforced.
Arguably, such consumer "agreements" were outside of the
original scope of the FAA. Before the FAA was enacted, a skeptical
senator was reassured that the FAA was not intended to cover
arbitration agreements "offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive
customers or employees."8 2 Nevertheless, given the Supreme Court's
most recent precedent, there is a continued reluctance by courts to
invalidate arbitration agreements, including mandatory arbitration
agreements. The Court has, however, recognized the invalidity of
arbitration agreements under the FAA in two circumstances: (1) in
cases not involving interstate commerce8 3 and (2) "upon such8 4grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
Plaintiffs are almost always unsuccessful when arguing that a
nursing home admission contract does not constitute interstate
commerce and thus does not fall within the purview of § 2 of the
FAA.8 5 Most plaintiffs arguing against a nursing home's motion to
compel arbitration are, by necessity, forced to argue under the second
category-state contract law.8 6 These cases typically arise after a
plaintiff (generally the nursing home resident, a family member, or
the estate of the resident) files suit against an LTC facility. In

81. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah H. Hensler, "Volunteering" To Arbitrate Through
PredisputeArbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
55, 63 tbl.2 (2004).
82. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (citing Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. on the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary,67th Cong. 4th Sess. 9-11 (1923)).
83. See, e.g., Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd. P'ship, 155 F.3d 16, 32 (Okla. 2006) (finding
an insufficient nexus between the LTC contract and interstate commerce to fall within the
purview of the FAA).
84. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
85. See discussion infra Part III.A (describing how disputes over LTC contracts easily fall
within the purview of interstate commerce).
86. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 ("[U]pon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.").
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response, the LTC facility moves to compel arbitration in accordance
with the relevant contract, which is usually a clause contained in the
admission agreement. In response, many would-be plaintiffs argue
that the terms of the contract are procedurally and substantively
unconscionable, or that the signer did not have the capacity or
87
authority to sign and bind the resident.
Case law regarding LTC arbitration agreements is a fairly new
development, as the first case concerning these agreements did not
reach the appellate court level until 1993.88 As of 2008, state courts
had decided over one hundred cases regarding this issue, many of
which compelled arbitration.8 9 While case law remains somewhat
scarce and piecemeal, the occurrence of these agreements has become
increasingly pervasive. The majority of cases are arising in "sunshine
retirement states" where the long-term care industry is thriving:
Florida, Alabama, Tennessee, and California. Under every approach
mentioned above, however, plaintiffs are largely unsuccessful in
combating compelled arbitration.

III. COMBATING COMPELLED ARBITRATION
Parties seeking to defeat a motion to compel arbitration most
frequently attempt to escape the purview of the FAA in order to apply
more favorable state law, claim unconscionability, or assert nonsignatory defenses. Defeating a motion to compel arbitration is
difficult, and parties frequently fail on all three grounds. Recent case
law illustrates how each of these approaches is ill-suited to deal with a
motion to compel arbitration in the long-term care context.
A. The First Line of Defense: Avoiding the FAA
Plaintiffs often seek to avoid FAA coverage because many state
laws disfavor arbitration, making it easier to defeat a motion to
compel arbitration. To fall within the scope of § 2 of the FAA, the
underlying transaction must involve interstate commerce. 90 Because §
87. These arguments are addressed at length below. See discussion infra Parts III.B
(unconscionability arguments), III.C (non-signatory arguments).
88. See Krasuski, supra note 20, at 273 (noting that Timms v. Greene, 427 S.E.2d 642 (S.C.
1993), was the first such decision).
89. A Westlaw search conducted on January 10, 2009, reveals that over one hundred state
appellate cases have been decided on this issue. As of 2004, state courts had decided roughly
thirty cases regarding the issue. Id.
90. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995) (holding that the
phrase "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce" should be read broadly to
extend the FAA to the outer limits of "Congress' Commerce Clause power").
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2 of the FAA does not define the phrase "involving commerce," 9 1
parties generally must establish the existence of a sufficient nexus
between the care provided by the LTC facility and the interstate
commerce at issue in order to fall within the purview of that section of
the FAA. 92 Parties seeking to compel arbitration have argued
successfully that this nexus is easily satisfied because LTC facilities,
being critical to the Medicaid and Medicare regimes, are subject to
pervasive federal regulation, have a significant economic impact on
interstate commerce, and use a large amount of out-of-state products,
93
such as prescription drugs, food, and equipment.
The Supreme Court's broad interpretation of "involving
commerce" supports this pro-LTC facility analysis of the FAA. 94 After
the Court struck down a narrow interpretation of "involving
commerce" in Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc., v. Dobson, the
state of Alabama began enforcing motions to compel arbitration under
the FAA brought by LTC facilities. In 2004, the Supreme Court of
Alabama compelled arbitration after an elderly woman's estate sued
her former nursing home for negligence. 95 Finding that the FAA
supplanted anti-arbitration state law, the Alabama court listed
several factors it considered, including: that (1) ninety-five percent of
medical supplies were purchased from out-of-state suppliers
(including such items as nursing home linens); (2) several of the
nursing home residents were from out of state; and (3) ninety-five
percent of the nursing home income was federally funded by Medicaid
(eighty percent) or Medicare (fifteen percent). 96 The court compelled
arbitration under the FAA even though the plaintiff herself was a
resident of Alabama and received no Medicaid or Medicare funds to
pay for her care. 97 LTC facilities seeking to compel arbitration under
the FAA generally do not have a difficult time establishing a nexus
between the underlying action and interstate commerce because the
LTC industry is subject to extensive federal regulation.
91. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
92. See, e.g., McGuffey Health & Rehab. Ctr. v. Gibson, 864 So. 2d 1061, 1063 (Ala. 2003)
(discussing the nexus requirement and concluding that 'Medicare funds should be considered in
determining whether the admission agreement had a substantial effect on interstate commerce").
93. Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So. 2d 983, 987-88 (Ala. 2004) (detailing a
multitude of factors that established the necessary nexus between the LTC facility's services and
interstate commerce, including "that the nursing home was almost completely controlled by
federal regulations and that 95% of the income received by [it] for providing nursing-home
services is in federally funded Medicaid").
94. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 268.
95. Owens, 890 So. 2d at 984-86.
96. Id. at 987-88.
97. Id. at 988.
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Under narrow circumstances, however, escaping the reach of
the FAA is still possible with an "involving commerce" argument. In
2006, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Bruner v. Timberlane Manor
Ltd. Partnershipheld that a nursing home admissions contract had an
insufficient connection to interstate commerce and that, as a result,
the FAA did not preempt state law. 98
The Bruner court persisted in its refusal to follow other
states, 99 holding that accepting Medicare and Medicaid payments was
insufficient to invoke the FAA under the theory of "interstate
commerce." 10 0 The court acknowledged that nursing homes are heavily
regulated by a "maze" of federal regulation. 10 1 It also recognized that
other state courts have documented a nexus between interstate
commerce and have found the distribution of Medicare and Medicaid
funding sufficient to trigger the FAA preemption of contrary state
arbitration law.' 02 Refusing to follow such precedent, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that because the U.S. Supreme Court has not
decided whether Medicare or Medicaid funding is "an exercise of
Congress' Commerce Clause power," it would refuse to treat federal
funding as an "indici[um] of commerce that triggers the FAA."'103 Thus
far, no other state has followed Oklahoma's interpretation of
interstate commerce, and plaintiffs in these cases rarely succeed in
10 4
avoiding the FAA's reach.
In contrast, parties occasionally succeed in arguing that they
may contract out of the FAA. The Bruner court held that the FAA
failed to preempt state law because the arbitration agreement in
question called for state law to govern. 0 5 Thus, the terms of an
arbitration agreement successfully can override the broad reach of § 2
of the FAA. 10 6 Under the FAA, an arbitration agreement must be
enforced in accordance with its own terms. Parties are free to
structure the contract to meet their needs by specifying whether the

98. Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd. P'ship, 155 P.3d 16, 32 (Okla. 2006).
99. See generally Owens, 890 So. 2d 983; McGuffey Health & Rehab. Ctr. v. Gibson ex rel.
Jackson, 864 So. 2d 1061 (Ala. 2003); Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So. 2d 507 (Miss.
2005); In re Nexion Health at Humble, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 67 (Tex. 2005).
100. Bruner, 155 P.3d at 31.
101. Id. at 25.
102. Id. at 28-30 (discussing cases from Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas).
103. Id. at 29-30.
104. See generally Sooner Geriatrics, LLC v. Crutcher, No. CIV-07-244-M, 2007 WL 2900535,
at *2 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 3, 2007) (failing to recognize absence of nexus rationale).
105. Bruner, 155 P.3d at 32.
106. Id. at 24 (discussing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989)).
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arbitration should be conducted under federal or state law. 10 7 In
Bruner, the arbitration agreement called for the application of state
arbitration law. 108 The court held that "[b]y permitting the courts to
'rigorously enforce' such agreements according to their terms ... we
give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties,
without doing violence to the policies behind by [sic] the FAA." 10 9
Thus, it is always possible that an admission agreement contains
some potentially pro-consumer terms.
Similarly, in 2007, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the
parties to an LTC contract containing an arbitration agreement were
bound by the terms of their contract. 10 The court quickly dismissed
the defendant's argument that the FAA should preempt state law,
holding that while the FAA would ordinarily govern the agreement,
the parties were bound by the terms of the contract." In the case
before the court, the parties provided that the agreement was to be
governed by Tennessee's arbitration act. The court noted, "We need
not belabor our analysis on this point because.., the nursing-home
contract[] expressly provides that 'this agreement for binding
arbitration shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with
the laws of the state where the Center is licensed.' "112
Allowing parties to contract out of the FAA affords plaintiffs
the opportunity to escape pro-arbitration precedent under the FAA.
However, LTC residents generally do not take part in drafting the
arbitration agreement. LTC facilities are likely to respond to the most
recent precedent by adapting the text of their admission contracts to
call for explicit coverage under the FAA.
B. Unconscionability
The most common claim advanced by a plaintiff attempting to
strike down a mandatory arbitration clause in an LTC contract is, by
far,
unconscionability. 113 Although
several
unconscionability
107. Bruner, 155 P.3d at 24-25.
108. Id. at 25.
109. Id.
110. Owens v. Nat'l Health Corp., 263 S.W.3d 876, 883 (Tenn. 2007).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Katherine Palm, Note, Arbitration Clauses in Nursing Home Admission Agreements:
Framingthe Debate, 14 ELDER L.J. 453, 465 (2006) ('The view that an agreement to arbitrate is
unconscionable when well supported by the facts, is perhaps the strongest argument to retain
the right to a jury trial."); JANE BELLO BURKE, THE ENFORCEABILITY OF ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS IN LONG-TERM CARE: FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND STATE LAW CHALLENGES 6 (2006),
http://www.healthlawyers.orgfMembers/PracticeGroups/HLL/Toolkits/Documents/E-Enforceabili
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challenges have prevailed, the vast majority have failed. 114 In its
purest form, unconscionability is defined as "extreme unfairness." 115
To prevail under the doctrine of unconscionability, the party
challenging the arbitration agreement generally must present an
exceedingly strong factual showing that the agreement was both
procedurally and substantively unfair." 6 It is often difficult, however,
to prevail under the theory of unconscionability where the state is
hostile to the doctrine, which most states are.
Procedural unconscionability requires an objective inquiry into
"improprieties" in the formation of the contract." 7 In the LTC context,
improprieties most often arise when a facility fails to inform a resident
of the presence of an arbitration clause or of the consequences of the
clause, including the waiver of a jury trial. Substantive
unconscionability requires inquiry into the actual terms of the
contract to determine whether they are "unduly harsh, commercially
unreasonable,
and
grossly
unfair"
under
the
particular
circumstances. 1 8 In the LTC context, the terms of an arbitration
agreement are sometimes considered "unduly harsh" when the
arbitration process is prohibitively expensive or geographically
distant. Finding the perfect storm of procedural and substantive
unconscionability, however, is often an insurmountable task for
parties seeking to avoid arbitration.
The Third District Court of Appeals of Florida provided an
illustrative
example
of the challenging
task of proving
unconscionability, especially where the court has a preexisting
hostility toward such claims. 1 9 In Etting v. Regents Park at Aventura,
Inc., the plaintiff (the son of a deceased nursing home resident) argued
tyArbitrationAgreements_- LTC.pdf ("The most common basis for invalidating arbitration
clauses in the nursing home context has been the doctrine of unconscionability.").
114. For an example of cases where the unconscionability argument failed, see Etting v.
Regents Park at Aventura, Inc., 891 So. 2d 558, 558 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (per curiam);
Philpot v. Tenn. Health Mgmt., Inc., No. M2006-01278-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4340874, at *5
(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2007). For an example of cases where an unconscionability argument
succeeded, see Prieto v. Healthcare & Ret. Corp. of Am., 919 So. 2d 531, 533-34 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2005); Romano ex rel. Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59, 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003).
115. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1560 (8th ed. 2004).
116. See 21 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:15 (4th ed. 2001) ("The
courts are split on whether a party must show both procedural and substantive unconscionability
to establish a valid defense to the attempted enforcement of an arbitration agreement, although
most courts require a showing of both.").
117. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1560-61 (8th ed. 2004) (citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 312 (3d ed. 1999)).
118. Id. at 1561.
119. Etting, 891 So. 2d at 558.
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that because his mother was legally blind when she signed the
arbitration agreement in her nursing home admission's packet, the
clause was invalid. 120 The court disagreed and compelled arbitration,
holding that "[n]o party to a written contract in [Florida] can defend
against its enforcement on the sole ground that he signed it without

reading

it."121

This hard-line approach taken by many states

frequently precludes a successful unconscionability argument.
rejected
have
also
courts
Tennessee
Likewise,
unconscionability claims. In Philpot v. Tennessee Health Management,
Inc., the LTC defendant admitted that the nursing home admission
contract containing the arbitration agreement was a contract of
adhesion. 122 However, a contract of adhesion is not dispositively
unconscionable under Tennessee law. 123 The court held that a contract
of adhesion is unconscionable only where the "inequality of the
bargain is so manifest as to shock the judgment of a person of common
sense, and where the terms are so oppressive that no reasonable
person would make them on one hand, and no honest and fair person
would accept them on the other."' 24 This language is markedly similar
125
to that of other U.S. jurisdictions and is difficult to satisfy.

120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. Bratton, 351 So. 2d 344, 348 (Fla. 1977)). It is
worth noting that the plaintiffs blindness in this case essentially "ups the ante" by precluding an
unconscionability claim not only where the plaintiff didn't read the contract, but where the
plaintiff couldn't read the contract. In the absence of coercion, this court and many others are
willing to uphold arbitration agreements. Id. at 558-59.
122. No. M2006-01278-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4340874, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2007).
A contract of adhesion is defined as:
a standardized contract form offered to consumers of goods and services on essentially
a 'take it or leave it' basis, without affording the consumer a realistic opportunity to
bargain and under such conditions that the consumer cinnot obtain the desired
product or service except by acquiescing to the form of the contract.
Raiteri ex rel Cox v. NHC Healthcare/Knoxville, Inc., No. E2003-00068-COA-R9-CV, 2003 WL
23094413, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2003) (quoting Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314,
316 (Tenn. 1996)).
123. See Hill v. NHC Healthcare/Nashville, LLC, No. M2005-01818-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL
1901198, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2008) ("The conclusion that the admissions contract
herein was an adhesion contract does not, however, end the inquiry. Contracts of adhesion are
not favored and must be closely scrutinized to determine if unconscionable or oppressive terms
are imposed which prevent enforcement of the agreement." (relying on the holding in
Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 316, 320)).
124. Philpot v. Tenn. Health Mgmt., Inc., No. M2006-01278-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4340874,
at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2007) (quoting Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 285 (Tenn. 2004)
(internal quotation omitted)).
125. See, e.g., Raper v. Oliver House, LLC, 637 S.E.2d 551, 555 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006);
Widener v. Widener, No. COA02-1242, 2003 WL 21791615, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2003);
Grady v. Grady, 504 A.2d 444, 446-47 (R.I. 1986).
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In Philpot, for example, the son of a nursing home resident
signed an admissions agreement containing a mandatory arbitration
126
agreement the day his mother was to be released from the hospital.
According to the trial court, the son was told that his mother had to
take an open spot at the nursing home immediately or someone else

would take

it.127

The woman's son later claimed that this urgency

forced him to flip quickly through a large stack of admission
documents, sign them without asking questions, and unknowingly
waive his mother's right to a jury trial in the event of a dispute with
the LTC facility. 128 The court rejected this line of reasoning, holding
that the law imposes "a duty on parties to a contract to learn the
contents ... of a contract before signing it" and that "signing it
without learning such information is at the party's own peril."129 The
court ultimately rejected the unconscionability claim and compelled
arbitration partly because the son was sufficiently educated, rushed to
130
admit his mother, and failed to ask the nursing home any questions.
Despite this precedent, some have suggested that judicial tides
are turning, with courts slowly becoming more sympathetic to
unconscionability claims. 1 31 One scholar suggests that the historic
judicial disfavor toward the doctrine of unconscionability has yielded
to the expanding use of mandatory consumer arbitration and the need
for a fairness escape valve. 132 For example, one study shows that, in
2002 and 2003, 68.5 percent of all unconscionability claims involved
arbitration agreements. 133 Moreover, courts were increasingly likely to
invalidate contracts involving arbitration clauses. The study found
50.3 percent of the arbitration agreements were held to be
unconscionable, while only 25.6 percent of other non-arbitration
contracts were held to be unconscionable. 134 Unfortunately for

126. Philpot, 2007 WL 4340874, at *6.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Hill v. NHC Healthcare/Nashville, LLC, No. M2005-01818-COA-R3-CV, 2008
WL 1901198, at *17 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2008) (holding an arbitration agreement
unenforceable where "the patient was discharged from the hospital but was not well enough to
return home, and her need for nursing home services was immediate," and where the patient had
no family members available to explain the contract terms to her).
132. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of
Unconscionability,52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 194-97 (2004).
133. Id. at 194-96 (comparing to 14.8 percent in 1982 and 1983).
134. Id. (comparing to 12.5 percent of the arbitration agreements and 15.2 percent of the
non-arbitration agreements in 1982 and 1983).

2009]

THE CIRCLE OF ASSENT

1037

plaintiffs in cases against LTC facilities, this general trend has not
been fully realized in the LTC context.
Nevertheless, most jurisdictions retain the possibility that a
mandatory arbitration agreement in the LTC context could be
unconscionable, recognizing that admitting an elderly or disabled
person to an LTC facility is often a traumatic experience riddled with
individualized and difficult circumstances. 135 In 2003, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals in Raiteri ex rel Cox v. NHC Healthcare/Knoxville,
Inc. invalidated a nursing home arbitration agreement, holding that it
was a "classic ... contract of adhesion."'136 The court held that the
elderly man who signed the contract was the weaker party, had no
bargaining power, and was offered the contract on a "take-it-or-leaveit basis" under "trying circumstances."' 13 7 While the court discussed the
doctrine of unconscionability, it never explicitly held that the contract
was unconscionable. 138 As noted above, Tennessee courts frequently
have rejected the argument that a contract of adhesion, without
evidence of unconscionability, is enough to invalidate an arbitration
clause. 139
At least two Florida cases have found arbitration agreements
in the LTC context unconscionable. 140 In Romano ex rel. Romano v.
Manor Care, Inc., a Florida trial court found both substantive and
procedural unconscionability where the admissions contract was
presented to the resident's elderly husband as "simply another
14 1
document required to be signed as part of the admission process."
The court also found evidence
of "egregious
substantive
135. See Hill, 2008 WL 1901198, at *17 (noting that "some of the circumstances relevant to
determining whether an agreement is a contract of adhesion are also relevant to the question of
whether the agreement was fairly entered into"). Some of the factors courts consider include: (1)
whether there were any other nursing homes in the area; (2) who signed the admissions
agreement; (3) whether the person signing the admissions agreement was educated; and (4)
whether the person signing the admissions agreement was informed by the LTC facility of the
existence and terms of the arbitration provision. E.g., id. at *9-11.
136. Raiteri ex rel Cox v. NHC Healthcare/Knoxville, Inc., No. E2003-00068-COA-R9-CV,
2003 WL 23094413, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2003).
137. Id.
138. Id. at *9 (holding instead that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because of a
non-signatory argument).
139. See Philpot v. Tenn. Health Mgmt., Inc., No. M2006-01278-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL
4340874, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2007) (stating that "we must examine the agreement and
determine whether it is a contract of adhesion, and if so, whether it contains such terms that
render it unconscionable or oppressive").
140. See Prieto v. Healthcare & Ret. Corp. of Am., 919 So. 2d 531, 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005); Romano ex rel. Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59, 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
141. See Romano, 861 So. 2d at 63-64 (noting that the husband was asked to sign the
admission papers only after his wife was admitted to the LTC facility "without being told that his
failure to sign them would not affect her care or her ability to stay in the home").
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unconscionability" where the terms of the contract violated state law
by severely limiting the recovery of punitive damages and attorneys'
fees through an arbitration procedure. 142 The court, articulating a
common obstacle faced by plaintiffs in these cases, recognized that
compensatory damages likely would be small given the advanced age
of the plaintiffs. 14 3 Furthermore, it recognized that punitive damages
are the most promising, and sometimes the only, source of monetary
compensation for this group. 44 Thus, compelling arbitration, where
punitive damages are generally either barred or capped, would be
tantamount to the denial of any meaningful recovery. 45 In this
particular case, the resident's injuries were particularly troublesome
to the court and almost certainly contributed to the finding of
46
unconscionability. 1
Similarly, in Prieto v. Healthcare & Retirement Corporation of
America, the Florida District Court refused to compel arbitration after
finding both procedural and substantive unconscionability in a
nursing home admissions contract.1 47 The court found procedural
unconscionability where the daughter of the resident was asked to
sign her father's admission papers while he was en route to the
nursing home.' 48 The court suggested that this situation prevented the
daughter from meaningfully considering the agreement. 149 Perhaps of
greatest significance to the court were the actual terms of the
arbitration agreement, which, like the Romano agreement, eliminated
certain statutory remedies, including punitive damages. 5 0 The
agreement also limited the scope of discovery. 151 The court relied on
Romano to hold the contract terms substantively unconscionable. 1 52
However, neither Romano nor Prieto has been followed subsequently.
Unconscionability is an inherently subjective inquiry, and courts
generally are unwilling to use it to invalidate arbitration agreements.

142. Id.
143. Id. at 63.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (stating that "Josephine was only in the nursing home for thirty days but developed
bed sores and received grossly substandard care").
147. Prieto,919 So. 2d 531, 533-34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
148. Id. at 533.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 533-34.
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C. The Power to Bind: Non-signatory Arguments
The next line of defenses used by plaintiffs to defeat motions to
compel arbitration-making non-signatory arguments-is also largely
unsuccessful. Non-signatory defenses most often are invoked in the
following two situations: (1) when the LTC resident fails to sign the
arbitration agreement or (2) when a family member signs the
agreement on behalf of the LTC resident. 153 The outcome of these
challenges depends largely on state law.
In several cases, plaintiffs have claimed that they cannot be
held to the arbitration agreement because they or a representative of
the LTC facility failed to sign the arbitration agreement. For example,
in Community Care Center of Vicksburg v. Mason,154 the case
discussed in Part I, supra, the plaintiff failed to initial after the words
"PLEASE READ CAREFULLY," which preceded the arbitration
agreement. 155 Additionally, she and the nursing home representative
both signed the wrong signature lines. 156 When the nursing home filed
a motion to compel arbitration, Mrs. Mason argued that the
agreement was invalid because she failed to sign and initial the
appropriate provisions of the agreement. 157 The court noted that the
failure to initial the agreement was not dispositive and ultimately
held that Mrs. Mason's failure to initial did not invalidate the
contract. 158 Without a claim that Mrs. Mason intentionally left the
provision blank in order to reject the agreement, the court was
59
unwilling to hold the agreement invalid.1
In contrast, the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to compel
arbitration where a nursing home resident initialed the line indicating
that she had read the arbitration agreement but failed to sign the
arbitration provision. 60 This evidence, combined with the fact that the
resident's conservator twice failed to sign the arbitration provision,
provided ample evidence for the court to conclude that the resident
153. See Krasuski, supra note 20, at 275-76, for a more expansive list of areas where nonsignatory arguments arise.
154. Cmty. Care Ctr. of Vicksburg, LLC v. Mason, 966 So. 2d 220, 222-25 (Miss. Ct. App.
2007). Discussion of Mrs. Mason's case can be found in the introduction, supraPart I.
155. Id. at 223.
156. Id. at 226. However, the agreement shows that the titles under each line, "Facility
Representative" and "Resident" had been crossed out and corrected. Id.
157. Id. at 224.
158. Id. at 227-29.
159. Id.
160. Bedford Care Ctr.-Monroe Hall, LLC v. Lewis, 923 So. 2d 998, 999-1002 (Miss. 2006).
Note that the fact pattern is essentially the inverse of Community Care Center of Vicksburg v.
Mason, discussed earlier, supraPart I.
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made a "knowledgeable and express decision not to sign the
arbitration provision." 16 1 Arguments challenging the validity of the
agreement when the representative of the LTC facility fails to sign the
agreement are almost always unsuccessful because, according to the
162
courts, they lack evidence of express disapproval of the agreement.
Likewise, non-signatory defenses often arise when the task of
signing the arbitration agreement falls on family or friends of the LTC
patient rather than the patient herself. Long-term care facilities
frequently provide care to those who suffer from significant disability
or diminished capacity. 163 The difficult task, therefore, of admitting a
family member or friend to an LTC facility often falls to the family of
the resident. Generally, a spouse, parent, or adult child signs the
admission papers when the resident is admitted. 164 Only after the
family or resident files suit against the LTC facility do the family
members realize that they may have inadvertently waived their loved
165
one's right to a jury trial.
In response to a motion to compel arbitration, the signer of the
agreement (usually the spouse, parent, or adult child of the LTC
resident) often claims that he or she lacked the authority to sign the
arbitration agreement. 166 This argument succeeds when there was no
authority, either express or apparent, to sign the arbitration
agreement on behalf of the resident. And while courts have attempted
to draw a line between medical and legal decisions, doing so has
1 67
proven to be an elusive goal.
For example, a leading California case held that the daughters
of a mentally incompetent woman had no authority to enter into an
arbitration agreement on their mother's behalf. 168 The court noted
that a person "cannot become the agent of another merely by
161. Id. at 1001.
162. See Integrated Health Servs. v. Lopez-Silvero, 827 So. 2d 338, 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002) (noting that the defendant had "clearly" assented to the arbitration clause because both
parties acted like there was a contract, the defendant performed under the contract, and the
defendant signed other documents in the admissions agreement).
163. See Krasuski, supra note 20, at 276-77 (noting that "not uncommonly, residents have
diminished capacity"). Signing the admissions agreement is often impracticable, if not
impossible, for the resident, so that task often falls to the family of the resident.
164. Id.

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. A general power of attorney is "[an instrument granting someone authority to act as
agent or attorney-in-fact for the grantor." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1209 (8th ed. 2004). A
healthcare power of attorney is also known as an advance directive which is a "document that
takes effect upon one's incompetency and designates a surrogate decision-maker for healthcare
matters." Id. at 56.
168. Pagarigan v. Libby Care Ctr., Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
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representing herself as such." 169 Moreover, state statutes authorizing
next-of-kin to make medical decisions for their incompetent mother
did not "translate into authority to sign an arbitration agreement on
the patient's behalf at the request of the nursing home." 170 The court
ultimately denied the motion to compel arbitration.
The California Court of Appeals subsequently expanded this
line of reasoning in a situation involving a husband who signed an
arbitration agreement on behalf of his wife who was suffering from
dementia. 17' In this case, the court distinguished between medical and
legal decisions, stating that the decision to enter into an arbitration
agreement is a legal agreement rather than a "necessary decision that
must be made to preserve a person's well-being." 172 Because the
arbitration agreement dealt with a patient's legal rights-in
particular, the waiver of a jury trial-the court refused to recognize
that the authority of the next-of-kin or spouse fell within statutory
provisions allowing for surrogate medical decisionmaking.173
Increasingly, state courts will refuse to compel arbitration absent
proof of actual express or apparent authority. 174
However, the Tennessee Supreme Court recently rejected the
legal/healthcare
distinction
recognized
by
California
and
Mississippi. 75 In Owens v. National Health Corporation, the court
relied heavily on the language contained within the "Durable Power of
Attorney for Health Care" form executed between a nursing home
resident and her "designated signors" to compel arbitration. 176 The
power of attorney in this case granted the resident's attorney-in-fact
the "power and authority to execute ... any waiver, release or other
document which may be necessary in order to implement the health
care decisions that this instrument authorizes my Attorney-in-Fact to
169. Id. The court noted that in order for the daughters to be agents of the mother (the
purported principal), the mother must have employed the daughters or caused third-party
reliance. The court stated that "[t]his comatose and mentally incompetent woman" did nothing to
cause the LTC facility to "believe either of her daughters was authorized to act as her agent in
any capacity." Id. at 895.
170. Id. at 895.
171. Flores v. Evergreen at San Diego, LLC, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 823, 825 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
172. Id. at 832.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Miss. Care Ctr. of Greenville, LLC v. Hinyub, 975 So. 2d 211, 218 (Miss. 2008)
(holding that husband as "health care surrogate" did not have authority "to enter into the
arbitration provision contained within the admissions agreement"); Hendrix v. Life Care Ctrs. of
Am., Inc., No. E2006-02288-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4523876, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2007)
(refusing to compel arbitration where daughter of nursing home resident had power of attorney
effective only after mother was incapacitated-which she was not).
175. Owens v. Nat'l Health Corp., 263 S.W.3d 876, 883-85 (Tenn. 2007).
176. Id. at 880.
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assist me to make, or to make on my behalf."'177 The court interpreted
this language to mean that the attorney-in-fact had the authority to
make any health care decision that the resident could make if she
were capable of doing so. 178 Consequently, the court held that an
attorney-in-fact did have the authority to sign a mandatory
arbitration agreement because this step was required in order to
"consent" to health care. 179
The court noted that its holding was based primarily upon the
language of the power-of-attorney agreement executed between the
resident and her attorney-in-fact. Nevertheless, it suggested a much
broader holding through dicta. 8 0° The court dismissed the distinction
between medical and legal decisions as little more than a misinformed
perception. The court pointed out that every contract signed for a
health care service is technically a "legal decision.''
The court
proceeded to make a policy-based argument that the recognition of a
medical/legal distinction could make every "contract signed by an
attorney-in-fact.., subject to question as to whether the provision
constitutes an authorized 'health care decision' or an unauthorized
'legal decision.' "182 Ultimately, the court worried that holding
otherwise would leave a "mentally incapacitated principal" in "legal
83
limbo," making it difficult to obtain necessary medical services.
It is unclear how far Owens extends. If courts follow its broad
holding and refuse to draw a distinction between a general and
healthcare power of attorney, families and residents will be left with
very few defenses to escape these mandatory arbitration agreements.
IV. PUTTING AGREEMENT BACK INTO ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: THE
CIRCLE OF ASSENT

Until the Supreme Court 8 4 specifically addresses the
enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements in long-term care
contracts, lower courts must continue to wrestle with motions to
compel arbitration. As an alternative to current approaches, the Circle
of Assent doctrine can be employed to assure arbitration's best and

177. Id.
178. Id. at 883-85.
179. Id. at 884.
180. Id. at 885.
181. Id. at 884.
182. Id. at 885.
183. Id.
184. Or, in the alternative, until the legislature specifically addresses the enforceability of
mandatory arbitration agreements in long-term care contracts.
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most efficient use in the LTC industry. Under the Circle of Assent
analysis, "the party who signs a printed form furnished by the other
party will be bound by the provisions in the form over which the
parties actually bargained and other such provisions that are not
unreasonable in view of the circumstances surrounding the
18 5
transaction."
A. CurrentState of Affairs
An analogy can be drawn between the use of arbitration
agreements and the use of prescription drugs. When arbitration
agreements and prescription drugs are used wisely, they can provide
great benefits. However, when used incorrectly, or even abused, the
results are potentially disastrous. Given the current state of affairs
surrounding the use of arbitration agreements in LTC agreements, it
is not surprising that calls for reform are arising. These calls for
reform are coming not only from trial lawyers, but also from
arbitrators and their professional organizations as well.1 8 6 To assure
arbitration's best and most efficient use in the LTC industry, the
practice of using mandatory arbitration agreements must be reformed.
The current use of mandatory arbitration in LTC contracts is
troubling and has recently generated fierce debate in the House
Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law.18 7 The debate
was spurred by lawmakers who believe that "arbitration can be a fair
and efficient way to handle disputes, but only when it is entered into
knowingly and voluntarily by both parties."'8 8 In his testimony before
the subcommittee, Richard Naimark, Senior Vice President of the
American Arbitration Association, admitted that "the public policy in
the United States on consumer ...arbitration is something that can
use some fixing, some balancing"'1 9 The fixing and balancing that Mr.
Naimark calls for must be done with a realistic perspective on the
problem.

185. Parton v. Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile-Cadillac-Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 634, 637-38 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1987).
186. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing, supra note 59 (statement of Richard
Naimark, Senior Vice President of the American Arbitration Association) [hereinafter Statement
of
Richard
Naimark],
available
at
http://judiciary.senate.govfhearings/testimony
.cfm?id=3055&witid=6828.
187. Id.
188. Press Release, U.S. Senator Russ Feingold, Sen. Russ Feingold, Rep. Johnson Introduce
Measure to Preserve Consumer Justice (July 12, 2007) [hereinafter Press Release], available at
http://feingold.senate.gov/-feingold/releases/07/07/20070712.html.
189. Statement of Richard Naimark, supra note 186.
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By the early 1990s, many believed that the LTC industry was
entrenched in a full-scale crisis. 190 In 2002, William Minnix, President
of the American Association of Homes and Services for the Aging,
stated that "[i]f substandard nursing homes don't improve, public
pressure will drive them out of business." 191 In a survey of six states,
an average of eight percent of all nursing home residents were
reported to suffer from bed sores. 192 With such signs of abuse and
neglect, it is no surprise that lawsuits quickly followed. In 1985, a
Florida law firm, Wilkes & McHugh, opened for business. 193 Its
purpose was to sue nursing home chains for abuse and neglect of the
elderly and disabled, originally an insurmountable task because
nursing homes were seemingly impenetrable and the plaintiffs were
elderly, making any meaningful economic recovery difficult. 194 Wilkes
& McHugh easily disproved this theory, and in 2008 they proudly
boasted on their website homepage that they had earned over "$300
million in verdicts."1 95 Interestingly, Wilkes & McHugh focused jurors'
attention on returning punitive and pain-and-suffering damages and
often succeeded in causing jurors to "see nursing home owners as
heartless profiteers.' 9 6
During the so-called LTC "crisis," insurance premiums rose to a
level that created an imminent danger of putting many major LTC
chains out of business. 197 In response, many nursing homes employed
various risk management programs, most incorporating a strong
arbitration component.1 98 Today, the so-called "premium shave" in
insurance costs has "eased" with costs leveling somewhat, but many of
the risk management devices persist, including the use of mandatory
arbitration agreements.1 99 Commenting on the use of arbitration
agreements in nursing home admissions packets, one nursing home
executive stated that "it takes the ability to inflame a jury out of the

190. Lois Aronstein, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2001, at A22.
191. Robert Pear, U.S. Begins Issuing Data on Individual Nursing Homes' Quality of Care,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2002, at A26.
192. See id. (stating that the number of bedsores ranged from four to thirty-seven percent at
individual nursing homes in six different states).
193. Baranick, supra note 33.
194. See id. (explaining that "[eliderly, retired clients don't suffer as much economic loss as
young ones with a bright professional future, so jury awards tended to be small").
195. Wilkes & McHugh, P.A., http://www.wilkesmchugh.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
196. Baranick, supranote 33.
197. Berger, supra note 28, at 40.
198. Id.
199. Id. ("Insurance premiums have actually stabilized for long-term care facilities over the
last couple of years .... ).
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issue."20 0 He further remarked, "It's harder to inflame a professional
arbitrator." 20 1 LTC facilities, therefore, prefer arbitration over
lawsuits "that can end up in the hands of a jury ...result[ing] in a
runaway verdict."202 Arbitration minimizes the risk of a crippling
monetary loss. 203 With the crisis "easing" and leveling somewhat,
perhaps the pendulum has swung too far in favor of the LTC industry,
necessitating reform to recalibrate the fairness of these "agreements."
The multitude of issues facing the LTC industry has not gone
unnoticed by the legislature. Recently, Senator Russ Feingold and
U.S. Representative Hank Johnson introduced the bicameral
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007.204 The Act seeks to amend the
Federal Arbitration Act "to make pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
employment, consumer, franchise,
or civil rights disputes
unenforceable." 20 5 Various consumer advocate groups support the bill,
including the National Consumer Coalition for Nursing Home
Reform. 20 6 It is, perhaps, no surprise that Kenneth L. Connor, an
attorney with Wilkes & McHugh, testified before the Subcommittee on
Commercial and Administrative Law in defense of this Act. 20 7 When a
court compels arbitration, there is no jury and no large punitive
damage award, which results in less lucrative verdicts for plaintiffs'
lawyers. 20 8 Compelled arbitration also results in limited recovery for
victims of abuse at the hands of LTC facilities. 20 9 Striking a balance
among all of these factors is a delicate task. Until lawmakers
successfully amend the FAA to control the use of mandatory
arbitration, state courts can employ an old, yet under-utilized and
unique, doctrine to determine whether an arbitration agreement
210
should be enforced.
B. Solution: The Circle of Assent
Courts faced with a motion to compel arbitration should
consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether
200. Id. at 41.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Press Release, supra note 188.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Statement of Kenneth L. Connor, supra note 59.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. This Note does not purport to comment on or evaluate the merits of the legislative
efforts, including the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007.
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the "consent" was truly informed. Recent case law has proven that
unconscionability analysis is ill-suited for the LTC context. 211 In
contrast, a totality of the circumstances, informed consent analysis
provides relief where a one-sided arbitration clause "cannot
reasonably be characterized as unconscionable," but something about
the agreement rings unjust. 212 The Circle of Assent doctrine, most
recently adopted in Tennessee, provides a practical and viable starting
point for courts.
As was mentioned earlier, the Circle of Assent doctrine holds
that "the party who signs a printed form furnished by the other party
will be bound by the provisions in the form over which the parties
actually bargained and such other provisions that are not
unreasonable in view of the circumstances surrounding the
transaction." 21 3 The distinctions between the Circle of Assent analysis
and the doctrine of unconscionability are critical. While the doctrine of
unconscionability focuses on the fairness of the terms actually agreed
upon, the Circle of Assent inquiry requires a broader examination into
whether the parties actually bargained for and agreed upon the
214
individual terms of the contract.
The Circle of Assent analysis is particularly useful in
scrutinizing arbitration agreements because it allows state courts to
bypass the FAA.21 5 As one scholar explains, "Although the Federal
Arbitration Act generally preempts state laws and policies regarding
arbitration, state contract law controls when the question is whether
the parties actually agreed to arbitration. '2 16 Once state courts are
allowed to make this inquiry, the totality of the circumstances
approach must resolve two critical inquiries: (1) "the extent to which
the [consumer] should have been aware of the provision" 217 and (2)
"the extent to which the provision shifts to the [consumer] a risk the
[consumer] was not expecting. '2 18 The less the consumer was aware of
the provision and the greater the burden of risk shifted onto the
consumer, the less likely the court will be to find an enforceable
211. See supra Part III.B (explaining that the vast majority of unconscionability challenges
to strike down a mandatory arbitration clause in an LTC contract have failed).
212. Lloyd, supra note 40, at 237-38.
213. Parton v. Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile-Cadillac-Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 634, 637-38 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1987).
214. Lloyd, supra note 40, at 243.
215. See Sternlight, supra note 45, at 164 (discussing the much accepted argument that the
FAA "would seem to exempt arbitration clauses from standard contract law regarding...
unconscionability").
216. Lloyd, supra note 40, at 258-59.
217. Id. at 246.
218. Id.
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agreement between the parties. 219 When making this inquiry, courts
employ a "sliding scale" in considering the following factors: (1) the
readability of the contract provision; (2) the length of the document in
which the provision appears; (3) any headings or other indicators of
the provision; (4) the sophistication of the signer; (5) the conditions
under which the consumer consents to the provision; (6) the
substantive fairness of the provision; and (7) whether the provision
was expected. 220 This list of factors is in no way exhaustive, and the
burden of proof is placed upon the party seeking to enforce the
provision. 22 1 Each factor is analyzed below to determine its potential
applicability to arbitration agreements in the LTC context.
1. Readability, Length, Headings
Arbitration agreements that appear in LTC admissions
contracts should be short, easy to understand, and have clear
headings. Despite the simplicity of this concept, it is critical that
courts not take a perfunctory approach to the application of this
factor. Nursing homes and other LTC facilities realize that this factor
is critical in the typical unconscionability analysis and have used this
knowledge to draft technically valid, yet arguably unfair,
agreements. 222 To ensure that an arbitration agreement withstands
judicial scrutiny, attorneys for LTC facilities advise their clients to use
large, bold lettering; clear headings; and concise, easy-to-understand
language. 223 For example, a recent trade article advised lawyers that,
although courts had not considered the issue yet, courts were likely to
compel arbitration where the arbitration agreement sets forth in "bold
face or some other prominent or distinct type that the resident is
giving up his or her right to a jury trial. ' 224 Courts should, however,
continue evaluating the readability, length, and headings in these
agreements to promote the goal of drafting consumer-friendly
agreements.

219. Id. at 247.
220. Id. at 247, 250-57.
221. Id. at 247 ("Tennessee case law places upon the person seeking to enforce a provision
'the burden of showing the parties actually bargained over the ... provision or that it was a
reasonable term considering the circumstances.' ").
222. See, e.g., Gillespie & Ulloa, supra note 12, at 2 ("[Tlhe agreement to arbitrate must be
conspicuous . . . . Burying an arbitration provision in the small print like the excess-mileage
charge in an auto lease is a sure way to end up in a courthouse and not in arbitration.").
223. See id. ("The arbitration provision could be in a bold-faced type and at least two font
sizes greater than the language before and after the section on arbitration.").
224. Paul W. McCartney, Binding Arbitration Agreements in Nursing Home Contracts in
Ohio: Are They Enforceable?, 1 OHIo TORT L.J. 139 (2007).
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2. Consumer Sophistication
Consumer sophistication is another important factor in the
Circle of Assent analysis. The nature of the LTC industry presents a
unique challenge: who exactly is the ordinary, reasonable signer of an
LTC admissions contract? Generally, it is not a healthy, mentally and
physically whole, "reasonable" person. 225 Where there is some question
surrounding the sophistication of the signer, the party seeking to
uphold the arbitration agreement should have the burden of proving
'
that the signer is equally or more sophisticated than "the norm. "226
Where the signer falls below "the norm," courts should consider
whether the LTC facility knew or should have known about this
particular person's individual situation. 227 This allocation of burden
forces LTC facilities to draft arbitration agreements that are
comprehensible to their average resident or signer while affording
facilities the ability to adopt extra precautions for especially
vulnerable residents. If the LTC facility knew or should have known
that the particular resident fell below the norm, then the court should
take extra care when considering whether the signer was really within
228
the Circle of Assent.
3. Conditions Surrounding Consent
Courts should study the events surrounding the signing of an
arbitration agreement to determine whether the agreement is outside
of the Circle of Assent. For example, did the resident and her family
take the agreement home and have several days to read and think
about it, or were they pressured to sign quickly to guarantee an
available bed? 229 The more informed the decision, the higher the

225. A long-time physician I interviewed noted:
I think people would be shocked to see a simple study documenting the
comprehension level of the average LTC patient. I can probably count on one hand the
number of sophisticated, competent patients I've cared for in the last decade!
Oftentimes, the reason they're in the LTC facility is their severely diminished
capacity. Someone should do a simple study.
Interview with F. Andrew Gaffney, MD, Professor of Med., Vanderbilt Univ. Sch. of Med., in
Nashville, Tenn. (Nov. 14, 2008).
226. Lloyd, supra note 40, at 253.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See, eg., One Stop Supply, Inc. v. Ransdell, No. 01-A-01-9509-CV-00403, 1996 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 228, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1996) (asking whether the customer had "an
ample opportunity to read [the contract] and study its provisions'); Gillespie & Ulloa, supra note
12, at 2 ("Absence of duress or coercion is of tantamount importance as well. If it is the facility's
policy that arbitration is non-negotiable, the facility may mute the suggestion of duress and
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likelihood that that the agreement falls within the Circle of Assent. 230
LTC facilities also can increase the likelihood of falling within the
Circle of Assent through resident or signer education. 231 Educating the
resident and signer fully and candidly about the content, pros, cons,
and potential ramifications of arbitration is one way to "legitimize
arbitration agreements" by instilling confidence in them. 232 However,
the court should examine the totality of the circumstances carefully to
determine whether the LTC facility actually is seeking to educate the
patient or simply seeking to pass judicial muster. For example, one
LTC trade journal suggests education via a "Resident's Guide to
Arbitration," which seeks to explain arbitration "clearly and in big
letters." 233 The article goes on to note that "[s]imply handing [a
"Resident's Guide to Arbitration"] out at the time of admission is going
to go a long way toward having that agreement upheld." 234 This form
of mechanical compliance should not be enough to hold that the
resident or signer has been educated about the arbitration agreement.
This factor is particularly useful because it encourages responsible
contract formation while simultaneously forcing both parties to move
beyond mere mechanical adherence to "the rules" established by case
law.
4. Substantive Fairness
Courts also should examine the substantive fairness of an
arbitration agreement in relation to the transaction as a whole. Case
law in this area frequently quotes Karl Llewellyn's observation that a
party to a standard-form contract "assents not only to the 'dickered
terms,' but also to any 'not unreasonable or indecent terms ... which
do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered
terms.' "235 The Circle of Assent doctrine seems to give the words
"reasonable" and "decent" a contextually specific meaning:
coercion by providing the prospective resident a list of comparable, alternative facilities in the
area.").
230. Lloyd, supra note 40, at 253-54.
231. See Gillespie & Ulloa, supra note 12, at 2 ("The intake person supervising the execution
of the residency agreement should point out the conspicuous, clear and unambiguous arbitration
provision. She or he should be prepared to answer questions regarding the arbitration
provision.").
232. See Kathrine Kuhn Galle, Comment, The Appearance of Impropriety: Making
Agreements to Arbitrate in Health Care Contracts More Palatable,30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 969,
995 (2004).
233. Berger, supra note 28, at 41.
234. Id.
235. See One Stop Supply, Inc. v. Ransdell, No. 01-A-01-9509-CV-00403, 1996 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 228, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1996) (quoting KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
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[lt must be emphasized that the assent analysis is not premised upon the actual assent
of the parties. Parties to a contract rarely consciously advert to any number of terms
which are binding upon them. If such terms allocate the risks of the bargain in a
manner which the parties should have reasonably expected, they are enforceable....
The parties will not be found to have agreed to an abnormal allocation of risks if the
only evidence thereof is an inconspicuous provision in the boilerplate of the standard
236
form.

It is almost beyond question that an arbitration agreement in
an LTC contract shifts a significant amount of risk to the resident and
signer. Arbitration provisions can, for example, cap or eliminate the
ability to recover punitive damages. 28 7 The agreements also often give
the LTC facility the option of choosing the arbitrator, defining the
scope of the discovery, and setting the duration of the hearing ahead of
28
time. 3
The Circle of Assent doctrine makes it clear that the shifted
risk does not have to be deemed "significant" by the resident at the
time the agreement was signed. 23 9 The case law also makes it clear
that "when people make contracts, they are seldom thinking about
default or disaster. '240 Thus, just because a resident does not properly
appreciate the risk at the time the resident consents to arbitration
does not mean the issue is not ripe for a court's consideration.
This factor, like the others, affords the LTC industry a
tremendous opportunity to craft arbitration agreements that a court
will enforce but that are also fair to residents. There is some evidence
that the industry already has begun balancing the risk between the
facility and the resident more evenly. 241 For instance, one trade
journal suggests the following tips for arbitration provisions: (1)
"[m]ake sure the agreement is mutual and covers all disputes"; (2)
"[o]ffer all legal remedies"; (3) "[m]ake [arbitration] cost-effective for
'
residents"; and (4) "[c]onsider providing an opt-out provision. "242
Arbitration's best and most efficient use involves risk-sharing between
the LTC facility and the resident. Otherwise, the provision likely will
fall outside of the Circle of Assent.

LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960)); Lloyd, supra note 40, at 254-55 (citing Parton v.
Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile-Cadillac-Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987)).
236. Lloyd, supra note 40, at 255 (quoting Parton,730 S.W.2d at 637); see also JOHN EDWARD
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 353 (1974).
237. RISKIN ET AL., supra note 37, at 619.
238. See id. at 613 (explaining the "manifest disregard of the law" standard).
239. See Lloyd, supra note 40, at 255 ("[T]he risk does not have to be a risk the parties would
have considered significant if they had thought about it when they made the contract.").
240. See id. (citing Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech, 939 F.2d 91, 99 (3d Cir. 1991)).
241. Berger, supra note 28, at 40.
242. Id. at 42.
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5. Predictability of Provision
The final factor allows an LTC facility to bring the resident
back into the Circle of Assent by showing that the resident should
have expected to consent to an arbitration agreement (and its terms)
in the underlying transaction. 243 The idea is that even if the resident
did not explicitly accept the arbitration clause, "[he or she] still fall[s]
within the circle of assent" because the terms of the agreement are
"reasonable in view of the circumstances surrounding the
transaction. ' 244 This factor has important educational aspects along
with positive policy implications. Future LTC residents and their
families can "expect" arbitration provisions (and the terms that
accompany these provisions) in LTC admission contracts only when
the LTC industry is candid about their use. If the industry wants to
continue using mandatory arbitration agreements, it must educate its
potential population about their existence and their terms. There is
little question that such education will spur debate as to the propriety
245
of mandatory arbitration in the LTC context.
V. CONCLUSION
The circumstances surrounding mandatory arbitration in LTC
contracts are complex. On one side of the debate is the purported
economic survival of the LTC industry. On the other side of the debate
are the lives and well-being of some of our most vulnerable citizens:
the elderly and disabled. The system of imposing mandatory
arbitration on LTC residents is currently broken.
The defenses most frequently asserted by plaintiffs include
escaping the purview of the FAA in order to apply more favorable antiarbitration state law, claiming unconscionability, and asserting nonsignatory defenses. Unfortunately for plaintiffs, these defenses are illsuited to fight a motion to compel arbitration. The LTC industry

243. See Lloyd, supra note 40, at 256 ("Even if the provision to the customer shifted a loss
that the drafter of the form would have borne under the law's default rule, the provision may be
within the 'circle of assent' simply because the customer should have expected such a provision in
the contract.").
244. See id. (quoting Contour Med. Tech., Inc. v. Flexcon Co., Inc., No. 01A01-9707-CH00315, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 314, at *9-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 6, 1998)).
245. One trade journal explains that they have suggested to their LTC industry clients
making a DVD or videotape explaining "the various subparts of the residency agreement,
including the arbitration provision." Gillespie & Ulloa, supra note 12, at 2. The journal goes on to
note, however, that "[w]e have all heard that you can lead a horse to water but you can't make
him drink, and it is true ....None of our clients has done as we suggested and made the tape or
DVD ....However, that does not diminish our enthusiasm for this suggestion." Id.
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largely consists of "interstate commerce" in the classic sense, making
an argument to escape the FAA impracticable. Additionally, most
state courts are loath to apply the disfavored doctrine of
unconscionability. State courts also are beginning to draw an
arbitrary line between a general and healthcare power of attorney,
resulting in inconsistent case law.
The goal of ensuring that consent to arbitrate is truly informed
is best achieved by applying the factors found in the Circle of Assent
doctrine. This totality of the circumstances analysis is superior to the
traditional unconscionability analysis because it escapes the purview
of the FAA, broadens the scope of inquiry, and potentially results in
positive policy externalities,
making the actual provisions
substantively fair while educating residents and signers about their
legal rights. Promoting arbitration that is fair will promote confidence
in the LTC industry and will begin to mend deep-seeded societal
mistrust while maintaining the viability of this form of alternative
dispute resolution.
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